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Card-based physical access control systems are used by most people on a daily basis, for example, at work, in public transportation,
or at hotels. Yet these systems have often very poor cryptographic protection. User identifiers and keys can be easily eavesdropped
on and counterfeited.The privacy-preserving features are almostmissing in these systems. To improve this state, we propose a novel
cryptographic scheme based on efficient zero-knowledge proofs and Boneh-Boyen signatures. The proposed scheme is provably
secure and provides the full set of privacy-enhancing features, that is, the anonymity, untraceability, and unlinkability of users.
Furthermore, our scheme supports distributed multidevice authentication with multiple RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification)
user devices. This feature is particularly important in applications for controlling access to dangerous sites where the presence of
protective equipment is checked during each access control session. Besides the full cryptographic specification, we also show the
results of our implementation on devices commonly used in access control applications, particularly the smart cards and embedded
verification terminals. By avoiding costly operations on user devices, such as bilinear pairings, we were able to achieve times
comparable to existing systems (around 500 ms), while providing significantly higher security, privacy protection, and features
for RFID multidevice authentication.
1. Introduction
Privacy-enhancing technologies constitute a significant part
of contemporary cryptography. Modern cryptographic pro-
tocols allow privacy-enhanced storing of sensitive data and
its processing by cloud services, private information retrieval,
or, for example, authentication based on personal attributes,
instead of user identifiers.The increasing intensity of research
into privacy is supported by national programs and strate-
gies, in particular in USA [1] and EU [2]. While most
of the novel schemes are aimed at electronic services, the
domain of physical access control is rather neglected. We
still use traditional locks, tourniquets, and classical card-
based access control mechanisms to manage physical access
to our premises. Butwith the increasing computational power
of the programmable smart cards, massive expansion of
various personal electronic devices, and the capabilities in
RFID communication of our smart phones, we can expect
penetration of privacy-enhancing technologies also to the
area of physical access control. In particular, in mass appli-
cations like public transportation, e-ticketing, e-passports,
and eIDs, the benefits of controlling physical access using
electronic devices with advanced cryptographic protocols are
very appealing.
In this paper, we propose and experimentally evaluate
a novel cryptographic scheme that particularly addresses
two phenomenons of contemporary cyberspace: lack of user
privacy and ubiquitous presence of many personal devices
(phones, smart cards, RFID tags, bluetooth dongles, smart
watch, etc.) that can be leveraged for stronger authentication
and more reliable access control.
In particular, we focus on safety applications in which
the users wear multiple safety equipment, such as helmets,
harnesses, boots, and protective suits, each with attached
programmable RFID tag capable of wireless communication.
A user is granted access to (potentially dangerous) premises
only if all his equipment is present. In existing systems,
the presence of the protective equipment is checked simply
by scanning the identifiers using RFID readers. Such an
approach is neither secure (identifiers can be counterfeited),
nor privacy friendly (identifiers can be traced, behavioral
profiles can be created, etc.).
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We propose a novel cryptographic scheme for multide-
vice authentication that is tailored for physical access control
systemswhere the usermust prove not only his own identifier,
but also many other auxiliary identifiers stored on separate
devices. In addition, the authentication sessionsmust support
all the key privacy-enhancing features; i.e., the access control
process must be anonymous (i.e., a user must prove that he
belongs to a group of authorized users, but without releasing
his concrete identity), unlinkable (all the sessions of a single
user cannot be linkable to a profile), and untraceable (system
administrators must be unable to trace honest users in the
system). On the other side, the schememust provide efficient
means for revocation and identification of malicious users.
In our cryptographic system, we provide all the required
features that are often contradictory and completely unavail-
able in existing schemes (in particular, the presence of many
identifiers versus anonymity; the untraceability and strong
cryptographic security versus efficiency on RFID tags and
stickers).
In our scheme, users can be granted access to premises
upon proving the presence of particular devices in their
proximity (e.g., the safety equipment) or personal attributes
(age, membership, citizenship, etc.). The access control pro-
cess may (the extent of privacy-enhancing features can be
initially set by the administrator; if required, identification or
user tracing may be enforced by the access control system)
proceed in a fully private manner, without disclosing user
identity or being traceable in the system.
2. Related Work
Most of the existing practical physical access control systems
are based on the following technologies: NXP’s Mifare and
DESfire; HID’s Prox and iClass; and Legic Prime and Advant.
NXP’s Mifare Classic, introduced in 1994, is a very popular
technology used in physical access control systems. Although
very old and insecure, the technology is still used in many
applications, even those security sensitive.The authentication
protocol is based on a unique 4B card identifier UID. In some
implementations, the card just reveals UID to the terminal
without any authentication protocol. In that case, UID can
be easily eavesdropped on and used by an attacker for imper-
sonation. In other implementations, a simple authentication
protocol is used but is considered insecure due to many
existing practical attacks [3–5] on the encryption algorithm
CRYPTO1. The insufficient security of the CRYPTO1 algo-
rithm used in the Mifare Classic made NXP improve the
cryptographic protection and release Mifare DESFire. The
old encryption algorithm was replaced by 3DES algorithm.
The authentication protocol was further improved in Mifare
DESFire EV1 which supports the AES encryption algorithm
[6]. The protocol itself remained without any major changes.
However, even Mifare DESFire was successfully attacked,
although the attacks [7, 8]were aimed on the implementation,
not cryptographic weaknesses. The HID Prox technology
contains no cryptographic protection. HID iClass employs
an authentication protocol based on the 3DES algorithm,
but attacks on this protocol are available [9]. Legic Prime
has weak proprietary cryptographic protection [10]. Legic
Advant is protected by symmetric block algorithms (DES [11],
3DES, and AES). None of themajor commercial technologies
provide any protection of privacy.
With the introduction of the first attribute-based cre-
dential schemes, such as the Idemix [12], U-Prove [13],
and HM12 [14], the variants for physical access control
systems also started to appear. The U-Prove scheme was
implemented on Multos smart cards [15]. The user is able to
prove his attribute in less than 1 s using this implementation.
However, the unlinkability property cannot be provided by
the cryptographic design of the protocol. The Idemix was
also implemented on the Multos smart card platform, with
cca 1 s needed to generate the attribute proof. The pilot
implementation of the HM12 scheme using Multos ML3
smart cards [16] required around 2.4 s in total to generate and
verify the proof, including the communication overhead. No
testing was done on multiple devices because the distributed
proof is not supported by these schemes.
Many types of personal and wearable devices forming
the so-called Internet ofThings (IoT) have appeared recently.
Authentication issues have been solved by different tech-
niques on these devises. Xu and Weitao propose biometric
authentication using wearables with face recognition using
smart-glass and gait recognition using smart watch. Riva
et al. [17] combine multiple sources of authentication data,
which is close to our approach. However, all these schemes
are using mainly biometric authentication factors. Cha et al.
[18] present a simple model for two-device authentication for
micropayment systems using mobile and wearable devices.
Nevertheless, their proposal lacks details and concrete cryp-
tographic functions. Butun et al. [19] address multilevel
authentication issue in cloud computing. Gonzalez-Manzano
et al. [20] present an access control mechanism for cloud-
based storage service access by using a set of devices.
However, their scheme is based on symmetric cryptography
and thus does not provide nonrepudiation. Hajny et al. [21]
use many wearable and IoT devices to do the authentication
process. However, the scheme misses privacy-enhancing
properties, because each user is uniquely represented by
his/her public key.
In summary, there are several authentication solutions
that involve IoT devices. However, there are only very few
papers focusing on multidevice authentication. Currently,
none of the proposals is provably secure and supports
the privacy-enhancing features. Furthermore, most of the
schemes remain only theoretic.
2.1. Our Contribution. The cryptographic scheme presented
in this paper takes a novel approach for the access control
based on rather the presence of multiple devices in user’s
proximity than the direct verification of user identifiers. The
novel approach has two key benefits: it significantly improves
the privacy protection of users and allows the authentication
based on the presence ofmany low-performance devices. Our
scheme is the first practical proposal with implementation
results that combines strong security, all standard privacy-
enhancing features, and efficiency.
Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 3
Figure 1: Schnorr’s proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm PK {𝑤 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤} in Z∗𝑝.
(i) Provable security: all algorithms are provably secure,
based on primitives with rigorous formal proofs.
(ii) Multidevice authentication: the scheme allows user
authentication based on the presence of many per-
sonal devices.
(iii) Anonymity: the scheme allows authentication based
on anonymous proofs of knowledge of private user
and/or device identifiers.
(iv) Unlinkability: the scheme prevents creating user
behavior profiles based on the authentication sessions
linking.
(v) Untraceability: the scheme prevents any entity from
tracing users (or their devices).
(vi) Efficiency: the authentication protocol is fast on con-
strained user devices (i.e., smart cards) and embedded
verification terminals.
(vii) Revocation and identification: the proposed scheme is
compatible with major revocation and identification
schemes [22–24] for attribute-based credentials.
We not only provide the cryptographic description and
security proofs of our scheme, but also provide practi-
cal implementation results based on benchmarks on RFID
devices and an embedded hardware terminal. These results
prove that the scheme can be practically implemented on
existing off-the-shelf devices.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Notation. We describe proof of knowledge protocols
(PK) using the efficient notation introduced by Camenisch
and Stadler [25]. The protocol for proving the knowledge of
discrete logarithm of 𝑐 with respect to 𝑔 is denoted as PK{𝛼 :
𝑐 = 𝑔𝛼}. The symbol “:” means “such that” and “|𝑥|” is the bit
length of 𝑥. We write 𝑎 $←󳨀 𝐴 when 𝑎 is sampled uniformly at
random from 𝐴. A secure hash function is denoted asH.
3.2. Proofs of Knowledge. The statements about discrete
logarithms in prime order groups can be easily proven using
the Σ-protocols [26].
A simple yet very useful protocol for proving the discrete
logarithm knowledge is based on the Schnorr signature
scheme [27]. Using this protocol, the prover proves his
knowledge of a discrete logarithm with respect to public
parameters 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑞; i.e., he proves the knowledge of 𝑤 : 𝑐 =
𝑔𝑤mod𝑝, where 𝑝 is prime modulus, 𝑞 is group order, and 𝑔
is Z∗𝑝 generator. The protocol is depicted in Figure 1.
The proof of discrete logarithm knowledge is a simple 3-
way protocol where the prover commits to a random number
𝑟 in the first step, receives a challenge 𝑒 in the second step,
and responds by 𝑧 to the challenge in the third step. The
protocol is Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK). Note
that the verifier does not have to know the private input 𝑤
of the prover to be able to verify its knowledge. We recall the
properties of the protocol below.
Proof. Completeness: prover who knows𝑤 is always accepted:
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 = 𝑔𝑟−𝑒𝑤𝑔𝑒𝑤 = 𝑔𝑟𝑔−𝑒𝑤𝑔𝑒𝑤 = 𝑔𝑟 = 𝑐.
Proof. Soundness: let us assume a cheating prover is ready to
answer at least 2 random challenges 𝑒, 𝑒󸀠 after committing
to 𝑟 without knowing 𝑤. Then, his responses 𝑧, 𝑧󸀠 must be
accepted in verifier’s checks:



















after multiplying both sides of (3) by 𝑔−(𝑧−𝑧
󸀠) and raising to
the power of (𝑒 − 𝑒󸀠)−1, we get
𝑔(𝑧
󸀠−𝑧)(𝑒−𝑒󸀠)−1 = 𝑐 (4)
and we get the discrete logarithm 𝑤 = (𝑧󸀠 − 𝑧)(𝑒 − 𝑒󸀠)−1 that
is easy to efficiently compute for the dishonest prover; thus
we reached the contradiction because the cheating prover
unaware of 𝑤 was assumed.
Proof. Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge: the ZK property is
proven by proving the existence of the followingZK simulator
𝑀∗𝑉:
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(1) the simulator randomly chooses the response 𝑧󸀠 $←󳨀
Z𝑞.
(2) the simulator randomly chooses 𝑒󸀠 $←󳨀 Z𝑞.





The 𝑀∗𝑉’s output 𝑐
󸀠, 𝑒󸀠, 𝑧󸀠 is computationally indistin-
guishable from the real protocol output 𝑐, 𝑒, 𝑧.
The protocol for proving the knowledge of a discrete
logarithm described above can be extended to the discrete
logarithm representation proof and discrete logarithm equiv-
alence proof [25]. The principles and security proofs remain
the same.
3.3. Bilinear Pairing. Let G1, G2, and G𝑇 be groups of prime
order 𝑞. A bilinear map e : G1 × G2 󳨀→ G𝑇 is a map which
satisfies bilinearity, i.e., e(𝑔𝑥1 , 𝑔
𝑦
2 ) = e(𝑔1, 𝑔2)
𝑥𝑦 for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈
Z𝑞; nondegeneracy, i.e., for all generators 𝑔1 ∈ G1 and 𝑔2 ∈
G2, e(𝑔1, 𝑔2) generates G𝑇; and efficiency, i.e., there exists
an efficient algorithm G(1𝑘) that outputs the bilinear group
(𝑞,G1,G2,G𝑇, e, 𝑔1, 𝑔2). The pairing is a bilinear map and it
is symmetric if G1 = G2. There are many types of pairings;
however only Weil, Tate, Ate, and Eta parings are mainly
used in cryptography due to their efficient computation. Our
scheme makes use of the Tate pairing [28], since it is the
fastest among them. Most of the known parings uses Millers
algorithm [29] to do computations on elliptic curves.
3.4. Weak Boneh-Boyen Signature. The weak Boneh-Boyen
(wBB) signature scheme [30] can be used to efficiently sign
(blocks of) messages. Furthermore, the signature scheme
can be easily integrated with the zero-knowledge proofs
so that the knowledge of signed messages (and signatures
themselves) can be proven anonymously, unlinkably, and
untraceably.We recall the signing and verification algorithms
below; the efficient proofs of knowledge are described, e.g., in
[24].
Setup: On input security parameter 𝑘, generate a bilinear
group (𝑞,G1,G2,G𝑇, e, 𝑔1, 𝑔2) ←󳨀 G(1𝑘). Take 𝑠𝑘
$←󳨀 Z𝑞,
compute 𝑝𝑘 = 𝑔𝑠𝑘2 , and output 𝑠𝑘 as private key and 𝑝𝑘 =
(𝑞,G1,G2,G𝑇, 𝑔1, 𝑔2, e, 𝑝𝑘) as public key.
Sign: On inputmessage𝑚 ∈ Z𝑞 and secret key 𝑠𝑘, output
𝜎 = 𝑔1/(𝑠𝑘+𝑚)1 .
Verify: On input the signature 𝜎, message𝑚, and public
key 𝑝𝑘, output 1 iff e(𝜎, 𝑝𝑘) ⋅ e(𝜎𝑚, 𝑔2) = e(𝑔1, 𝑔2) holds.
Showing the constant signature 𝜎 multiple times would
make the authentication protocol linkable. All user sessions
would be linkable to a single profile, which would make the
resulting scheme very privacy unfriendly. To avoid linkability
of signatures, users can only prove the knowledge of a valid
signature by using the proof defined in [24]. In this proof,
the user chooses a random value 𝑟 $←󳨀 Z𝑞 and computes
randomized auxiliary values 𝜎󸀠 = 𝜎𝑟 and 𝜎 = 𝜎󸀠−𝑚𝑔𝑟1. Then,
the knowledge of a signature is proven by constructing the
zero-knowledge proof 𝜋 = 𝑃𝐾{(𝑚, 𝑟) : 𝜎 = 𝜎󸀠−𝑚𝑔𝑟1} and
verifying e(𝜎, 𝑔2) = e(𝜎󸀠, 𝑝𝑘). The verifier is convinced that
the user indeed knows a valid signature on a knownmessage,
although the proof does not release any of these values. That
construction is perfect for our scheme, because the users
want to convince verifiers that they know (device) identifiers
signed by registrars, in an anonymous, untraceable, and
unlinkable manner.
ThewBB signatures were proven existentially unforgeable
against a weak (nonadaptive) chosen message attack under
the 𝑞-SDH assumption [30].
4. Multidevice Authentication with
Privacy Protection
First, we define the formal requirements on the authentica-
tion scheme.Next, we define the algorithms and entities in the
scheme. Finally, we present the concrete instantiation of the
privacy-enhanced multidevice authentication scheme based
on the wBB signatures described in the previous section.
4.1. Requirements. We require the scheme to be secure,
private, and efficient.
Security Requirements
Completeness: registered users must be accepted by the
Authenticate protocol.
Soundness: unregistered users must be rejected by the
Authenticate protocol.
Zero-Knowledge: the Authenticate protocol transcript
must be simulatable without the knowledge of identifiers,
thus provably releasing no sensitive information.
Privacy Requirements
Anonymity: users must be able to prove the knowledge of
their identifiers anonymously, without disclosing them.
Untraceability: user authentication sessions must be
untraceable by all system entities, including registrars.
Unlinkability: all single user’s authentication sessions
must be mutually unlinkable.
Efficiency Requirements
Readiness for RFID devices: the scheme must be fast on
constrained devices, in particular smart cards. No operations,
that are unavailable on RFID devices (such as bilinear
pairings), can be used in user’s algorithms.
4.2. Definition of Algorithms. We define the algorithms and
protocols of our scheme in this section. The communication
pattern is depicted in Figure 2 and employs the registrar (i.e.,
a central server that manages users and their equipment),
users (i.e., user devices such as smart cards or smart phones),
terminals (i.e., embedded devices with RFID readers typically
attached next to doors), and tags (i.e., devices that need to
be present during authentication and access control, typically










Figure 2: Architecture of multidevice authentication with privacy protection.
safety equipmentwith programmable RFID sticks, such as the
helmet, respirator, or harness).
(𝑝𝑎𝑟) ←󳨀 Setup(1𝑘, 𝑛): the algorithm is run by the
registrar. It inputs the security parameter 𝑘 and themaximum
number of tag classes (i.e., helmets, harnesses, boots, etc.).
The algorithm outputs the public system parameters 𝑝𝑎𝑟.
(𝑠𝑘𝑟, 𝑝𝑘𝑟) ←󳨀 Keygen(𝑝𝑎𝑟): the algorithm is run by
the registrar. On the input of public system parameters
𝑝𝑎𝑟, it generates its private key 𝑠𝑘𝑟 and public key 𝑝𝑘𝑟.




𝑖=1, 𝐼𝐷𝑢, 𝜎𝑢) ←󳨀 Register(𝑝𝑎𝑟, 𝑠𝑘𝑟, 𝑝𝑘𝑟): the
algorithm is run by the registrar. On the input of system
parameters and its keypair, the registrar generates the tags’
identifiers 𝐼𝐷𝑖 with corresponding signatures 𝜎𝑖 and user’s
identifier 𝐼𝐷𝑢 with a corresponding signature 𝜎𝑢. The tag
identifiers and signatures are securely delivered to tags and
the user identifier and signature are delivered securely to the
user device.
(0/1) ←󳨀 Authenticate(𝑝𝑎𝑟, ⟨𝐼𝐷𝑖, 𝜎𝑖⟩
𝑛
𝑖=1, 𝐼𝐷𝑢, 𝜎𝑢,
𝑝𝑘𝑟): the cryptographic protocol is run jointly by the user
device, tags, and the terminal. It inputs system parameters,
registrar’s public key, private identifiers, and corresponding
signatures and returns 1 iff signatures and IDs are valid, or 0
otherwise.
4.3. Instantiation Using wBB Signatures. In this section, we
present the concrete instantiations of cryptographic algo-
rithms defined in Section 4.2. We use the wBB signature
scheme to certify the identifiers of tags and users in the
Register algorithm and interactive proofs of knowledge to
prove the knowledge of respective signatures and identifiers
in the Authenticate protocol. We use the Camenisch-
Stadler notation [25] to describe the proof of knowledge
protocols.
Setup. The algorithm inputs the security parameter 𝑘 and
the maximum number of tag classes 𝑛. It generates the
bilinear group with parameters 𝑝𝑎𝑟 = (𝑞,G1,G2,G𝑇,
e, 𝑔1, . . . , 𝑔𝑛, 𝑔𝑢 ∈ G1, 𝑔2 ∈ G2) satisfying |𝑞| = 𝑘.
Keygen. The algorithm inputs the public parameters 𝑝𝑎𝑟,
selects random registrar’s private keys 𝑠𝑘𝑟 = (𝑠𝑘0, 𝑠𝑘1,
. . . , 𝑠𝑘𝑛, 𝑠𝑘𝑢)
$←󳨀 Z∗𝑞 , and computes the public keys 𝑝𝑘𝑟 =
(𝑝𝑘0 = 𝑔
𝑠𝑘0
2 , 𝑝𝑘1 = 𝑔
𝑠𝑘1
2 , . . . , 𝑝𝑘𝑛 = 𝑔
𝑠𝑘𝑛
2 , 𝑝𝑘𝑢 = 𝑔
𝑠𝑘𝑢
2 ). It
outputs the private keys as registrar’s private output and the
public key as the public output.
Register. The algorithm inputs the registrar’s keys and
public parameters, randomly selects tag and user identifiers
(𝐼𝐷1, . . . , 𝐼𝐷𝑛, 𝐼𝐷𝑢)
$←󳨀 Z𝑞, and computes the wBB signatures
(𝜎1, . . . , 𝜎𝑛) on tag identifiers (𝐼𝐷1, . . . , 𝐼𝐷𝑛) and the aggre-







that allow the construction of efficient proofs of
knowledge in the Authenticate protocol. The algorithm
outputs the tag identifiers and corresponding signatures as
a private output to tags. The user identifier, the aggregated
signature, and auxiliary values are outputted to the user as
a private output. Both tags and the user receive the initial
𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 required for the synchronization of the zero-knowledge
proofs as a private input. The algorithm is depicted in
Figure 3.
Authenticate. Authenticate is an algorithm distributed
among the user, terminal, and tags that inputs the identifiers
and respective signatures and outputs 1 iff (1) all signatures
are valid and created by the registrar and (2) all identifiers
of the user are present and signed. Otherwise it outputs
0. The protocol is a distributed proof of knowledge of
wBB signatures where the tags prove that they know their
identifiers and corresponding signatures (without actually
revealing them) and, at the same time, the user proves that
he has an aggregated signature on all his tag identifiers,
plus his own identifier. As the user does not know the
tag identifiers, all tags must be present and participate on
the proof construction. As a result, the user is able to
anonymously, untraceably, and unlinkably prove his valid
registration by the registrar and the presence of all his
tags, i.e., the safety equipment. The protocol is depicted in
abstract CS notation in Figure 4. We also provide the full
description in Figure 5 in Section 6 focused on implemen-
tation.
5. Security Analysis
The registrar issues the wBB signatures to tags and users
in the Register algorithm. Then, the user and tags prove
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Figure 3: Register protocol.
Figure 4: Authenticate protocol in CS notation.
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Figure 6: Tested scenario.
the knowledge of such signatures to the terminal using the
distributed zero-knowledge proofs in the Authenticate
protocol.
Lemma 1. The weak Boneh-Boyen signatures are unforgeable
against a weak chosenmessage attack under the 𝑞-Static Diffie-
Hellman assumption [30].
Lemma 1 is proven in [30].
Lemma 2. The protocol presented in Figure 5 is complete,
sound, and zero-knowledge.
We construct the proof for a tag 𝑖 using the standard
proving technique for zero-knowledge protocols. For other
8 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
devices and the user, the proof is constructed analogi-
cally.

































e (𝜎𝑖, 𝑔2) = e (𝜎
󸀠
𝑖 , 𝑝𝑘0) (9)
e (𝜎−𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑔
𝑟𝑖




















Error Probability. If implemented correctly, the user will be
always accepted.
Proof. Soundness: only registered users pass terminal’s check.
Assume a user who is not registered (i.e., does not know
the identifier 𝐼𝐷𝑖) and passes the terminal’s check for two









































Thus the user can efficiently compute both the random-
izer 𝑟𝑖 = (𝑠𝑟𝑖 − 𝑠
󸀠
𝑟𝑖
)/(𝑐 − 𝑐󸀠) and the identifier 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = (𝑠𝐼𝐷𝑖 −
𝑠󸀠𝐼𝐷𝑖)/(𝑐−𝑐
󸀠) and we reached the contradiction to our original
assumption.
Error Probability. The attacker will pass the verification check
if he can predict the challenge 𝑐.The probability of soundness
error is thus 𝑃 = 2−|𝑐| = 2−𝑞 = 2−224, which is negligible.With
an expected rate of 100 ms per challenge, the expected time
of breach is 4 × 1058 years.
Proof. Zero-Knowledge: the protocol releases no private infor-
mation, i.e., there exists a zero-knowledge simulator 𝑀∗𝑉.
Using the public parameters and the public key (𝑔, 𝑔𝑥) (we
follow the proof presented in [24] that allows the simulator
to input an auxiliary public key (𝑔, 𝑔𝑥) : 𝑔 $←󳨀 Z𝑞 from
the registrar), the simulator chooses randomly and uniformly
(𝑠𝑟𝑖 , 𝑠𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑟, 𝑐)
$←󳨀 Z𝑞, computes 𝜎󸀠𝑖 = 𝑔





−𝑐, and outputs the proof 𝜋 = (𝜎𝑖, 𝜎󸀠𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖,H(𝑟), 𝑐,
(𝑠𝑟𝑖 , 𝑠𝐼𝐷𝑖)). The simulated transcript is computationally indis-
tinguishable from the real run of the protocol.
Error Probability. The attacker can try to guess the randomiz-
ers 𝑟𝑖, 𝜌𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑢, 𝜌𝑟𝑢 and break the discrete logarithm assumption.
The probability is 𝑃 = 2−𝑞 = 2−224 for each device, which
is negligible. With an expected rate of 10 ms per computing
the guess (the exponentiation), the expected time of breach is
4 × 1057 years.
As a result of the zero-knowledge property and random-
ization of all signatures, the protocol is also anonymous,
untraceable, and unlinkable.
6. Implementation Aspects
The Authenticate protocol has been implemented as a
standard 3-way interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge protocol described in Section 3.2. We use a parallel
composition with one challenge and one response for all tags
of a user to construct an AND proof for both tag and user
signatures. The Authenticate protocol for 𝑖𝑡ℎ tag is fully
specified in Figure 5.
To keep user devices synchronized, we use a counter
that is initialized by a seed generated by the registrar. In the
beginning of each session, the counter increments. To avoid
losing synchronization, the hashed counter is broadcasted by
the terminal so that the devices can compare it with their
actual counter value (and with, e.g., 10 next precomputed
values) and sync in case their counter is behind. The hashed
counter also serves as the session identifier and thus is present
in all three steps of the protocol.
In the first step of the protocol, the tag generates random-
izers 𝑟𝑖, 𝜌𝑟𝑖 , 𝜌𝐼𝐷𝑖 , computes randomized signatures 𝜎
󸀠
𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖, and
computes the commitment to randomizers 𝑡𝑖. The random-
ized signatures, commitment to randomizers, and hashed
randomizers are sent to the terminal.
In the second step, the terminal randomly selects its
challenge 𝑐 and sends it to all tags and devices, together with
the obtained hash.
In the third step, the tag computes their answers 𝑠𝑟𝑖 , 𝑠𝐼𝐷𝑖
of the zero-knowledge protocol.
After receiving the answers, the terminal is able to verify
that the tag knows a valid signature and a corresponding tag
identifier with respect to registrar’s public key 𝑝𝑘, without
actually learning any user- or tag-identifying values.
The proof construction for the user is the same with the
exception that the answers containing tag IDs are omitted,
because the terminal makes use of the values received by
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Figure 7: Dependence of the proof construction time on the number of user device.
the devices. Instead of proving tag IDs, the user proves the
knowledge of his own user ID.
6.1. Performance Analysis. The scheme was designed to be
practical and fast on constrained RFID devices, such as smart
cards and programmable RFID tags. Therefore, the bilinear
pairings, which are the most computationally complex oper-
ations in our algorithm, are only computed in the terminal
which normally has more resources than user device. The
secondmost complex operation is the exponentiation (imple-
mented as scalarmultiplication of an elliptic-curve point) and
it is reduced to a minimum. The user device needs (5 + 2𝑑)
exponentiations to construct a “user proof” with 𝑑 personal
tags. Each tag must compute 5 exponentiations to generate
a “tag proof”. However, our implementation uses only 4
exponentiations, since the value (𝜎𝑖−𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖) is precomputed
within a Register protocol and is used for the randomized







plexity of the other operations (random number generation,
addition, and multiplication) are only minor, compared to
pairings and exponentiations. In order to verify the proof, the
terminal must compute (4+4𝑑) bilinear pairings and (4+3𝑑)
exponentiations.
We provide performance measurement of crucial opera-
tions on common devices, which are widely used in the access
control applications, i.e., a smart card, smart phone, smart
watch (as user devices), and a custom-built RFID terminal
with ARM or Intel CPU and programmable RFID tags (as
RFID tags attached to safety equipment). The hardware and
software specification of all the devices is presented in Table 1.
The testing scenario is depicted in Figure 6. The user
needs to hold a wearable device, such as a smart phone
(HUAWEIP9 Lite 2017), a smart card (MultosCard), or smart
watch (HUAWEI Watch 2) and some safety equipment, such
as helmets, harnesses, boots, and protective suits, each of
them with a programmable RFID tag attached. The tag is
equipped with a programmable chip SC23Z018 with Multos
4.2 operation system.The proofs are collected and verified by
a terminal. We use Raspberry Pi 3 to represent the terminal.
In another scenario, PC (Intel i7-7700 CPU, 16 GB RAM)
acts as a central authentication server representing the case
of a centralized access control system. The system uses RFID
communication between tags and a terminal, and NFC or
BLE communication between a terminal and a user device.
The performance of critical operations and the estimation
of the running time of the Authenticate protocol with one
RFID tag and one user device are presented in Table 2. In
addition, we provide measurement of the selected devices
where we consider different elliptic curves types, in particular
type A and D. Both curves satisfy the NIST key recommen-
dation for 80-bit security strength [31]. The performance is
measured in milliseconds (the measurement of clock cycles
is unavailable on the smart card platform) and the values are
an average of 10 measurements, excluding communication
overhead. For the implementation of EC operations, the PBC
library was used [32] on the terminal and jPBC [33] library on
Android devices. Native assembler code was used to perform
operations on the Multos smart card.
The proposed authentication scheme can be used inmany
types of access control scenarios and for different types of
devices. Therefore, we provide the results of each protocol
using one RFID tag. Furthermore, we present the crucial EC
operations’ benchmarks on a wide range of devices in Table 3.
The time is measured in milliseconds and the values are an
average of 10 measurements, as in the previous case. All mea-
surements were performed by using the elliptic curve d159
from the PBC library. We did not consider Android devices
as a terminal device, since the pairing operation requires too
much time and therefore it is not usable in practice.
Figure 7 depicts the time required for a proof construc-
tion on different devices (Multos smart card, Android smart
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Table 1: Specification of tested devices.
Type CPU/MCU OS RAM
Tag SC SC23Z018 Multos 4.2 2 KB
User SC SC23Z018 Multos 4.2 2 KB
User Phone Kirin 655 Android 7.0 3 GB
User Watch ARM Cortex-A7 Android 7.0 768 MB
Terminal Pi 3 ARM Cortex-A53 Raspbian 9.3 1 GB
Terminal PC Intel i7-7700 Debian 8.6 16 GB
Tag: programmable RFID stick, User: user device, Terminal: terminal, SC: smart card, Phone: HUAWEI P9 Lite 2017, Pi 3: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, andWatch:
HUAWEI Watch 2.
Table 2: Benchmark results based on EC type.
Terminal User Device Tag
[ms] [ms] [ms]
Elliptic Curve Type A
Exponentiation 10 67 81
Pairing 15 125 -
Verification 192 - -
Tag Proof Generation - - 444
User Proof Generation - 448 -
Elliptic Curve Type D
Exponentiation 4 38 40
Pairing 31 1050 -
Verification 271 - -
Tag Proof Generation - - 277
User Proof Generation - 273 -
Table 3: Benchmark results of all tested devices.
SC Phone Watch Pi 3 PC
[ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
Exponentiation 40 38 207 3.3 0.4
Pairing - 1050 6571 31 2.4
Tag Proof Generation 277 154 900 18 4
User Proof Generation 441 273 1502 24 5
Verification - - - 271 21
phone, and smart watch for various number of tags). These
devices act as a user device.
6.2. Revocation and Identification. Besides strong privacy-
enhancing features, there must be also mechanisms to revoke
and/or identify malicious users. All users are theoretically
identifiable and traceable by their user IDs. However, these
IDs are “hidden” in the signatures as the exponents. Due to
the discrete logarithmproblem assumption, one cannot easily
get the identifiers and do the revocation and identification.
However, our scheme is compatible with the major revo-
cation schemes that are already available for cryptographic
anonymous credential schemes [22–24]. In these revocation
schemes, the hidden exponent (the user ID) is used as a
revocation handle and can be disclosed only by designated
authorities. Additionally, valid users remain anonymous
while malicious users are identifiable and traceable by a des-
ignated authority, such as a court. Such schemes are provably
secure, efficient, and compatible without any modification;
thus we refer to their specification (e.g., the scheme designed
directly for smart cards [24]) in case revocation is needed.
7. Conclusions
We presented a cryptographic scheme that allows a novel
approach for controlling physical access. Instead of the
verification of fixed user or device identifiers, the terminals
can check only the knowledge of such identifiers in a private
manner, without explicitly exposing any personal informa-
tion or the identifiers themselves. Furthermore, the presence
of other RFID devices, possibly the safety equipment, can be
enforced. Our protocols are based on proven cryptographic
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algorithms and are very practical—the proofs can be gen-
erated in under 500 ms on constrained devices, such as
smart cards. We provided the full cryptographic description
of all algorithms, the security and efficiency analysis, and the
implementation results on constrained devices. We find the
scheme especially useful in applications where the physical
access to dangerous environment is granted upon proving the
presence of required safety equipment and where the strong
privacy-protection regulation is enforced by law.
As for the future work, we will focus on the optimization
of the verification algorithm, since the current verification
time grows linearly with the number of tags involved in the
authentication protocol. In particular, wewould like to reduce
the number of bilinear pairings which is the most time-
consuming operation in the protocol.
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